Seco and Digitalization

Veröffentlicht am 07.11.2025 21:58 Blog (EN)

Seco and Digitalization

title: "ASALfutur: High-risk project on the backs of the unemployed" date: 2025-11-07 tags:

  • Switzerland
  • Unemployment insurance
  • Digitalization
  • ASALfutur
  • SECO

ASALfutur: High-risk project on the backs of the unemployed

At the turn of the year 2025/26, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) is taking the final and most delicate step of its major IT project ASALfutur: The introduction of the benefit type Unemployment Compensation (ALE) in the new payment system ASAL 2.0. For this purpose, the IT infrastructure of unemployment insurance (ALV) will be largely shut down for around two weeks – including Job-Room, RAV systems and payment platforms.:contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}

Officially, this is a "planned operational interruption." In practice, it means: A highly critical system change in the middle of winter – with direct impact on those people who are most dependent on punctual payments.

1. What is concretely planned

According to official project communication and the information compiled by Clarus News, the situation is as follows:​:contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}

  • System shutdown:
    • From December 19, 2025, around noon, until January 6, 2026, 07:00, the systems of RAV, unemployment funds and the Job-Room platform will not be available.
  • No payments during the transition:
    • Between December 22, 2025 and January 6, 2026, no payments from ALV can be made; only payments already processed before December 19 will still go out until December 22.:contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
  • Advanced deadlines:
    • Job seekers should submit their documents exceptionally from December 4; everything must be available by December 19 so that payment can still be made in December.:contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}

SECO argues that the timing over the holidays reduces the number of affected working days, and that monthly payment is fundamentally ensured.:contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}

On X (Twitter), the message is correspondingly smoothed over: From January 6, 2026, the new system will run, while during the transition the systems are simply not available – a brief, strongly technically focused communication that only marginally touches on the real life situations of those affected.:contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}

2. High risk for people with thin financial buffers

The official presentation leaves a crucial point underexposed: Not all unemployed people have liquidity for two to three weeks of delay, let alone for the unexpected.

Critical questions arise:

  • What happens to people whose entitlement begins shortly before or during the interruption?
  • How are corrections, sanctions or retroactive adjustments handled when the systems are offline?
  • What hardship mechanisms exist concretely if the go-live does not go smoothly?

From the perspective of those affected, the planned interruption means:

  • Increased risk of rent arrears, reminders and consumer debt if payments are delayed.
  • More bureaucracy and stress: Anyone who misses the new deadlines and forms risks delays – even though they actually did nothing wrong.
  • Asymmetry of responsibility: Those affected must adapt early, while the state deliberately accepts a blackout of the systems.

These critical points are indirectly addressed in official communication, but not honestly spelled out – not even in the SECO tweet.

3. Project history: A chronic patient of federal IT

ASALfutur is not a young experiment, but a key project of the federal administration that has been running for years. The Federal Audit Office (EFK) has reviewed the project multiple times – and repeatedly identified weaknesses in leadership and control: The specialist departments were too little involved, recommendations had to be sharpened again and again.:contentReference[oaicite:6]{index=6}

Key points:

  • Long project duration: The project has been running for over a decade with repeated postponements and re-planning.
  • Cost increases: The cost framework was adjusted upward multiple times; already in 2021, the project volume was around 118 million CHF according to the EFK report – with additional millions due to delays and external specialists.:contentReference[oaicite:7]{index=7}
  • Complexity of ALE: The benefit type Unemployment Compensation (ALE) now being introduced accounts for about 90% of disbursed ALV benefits – and is according to EFK "the greatest challenge" of the project.:contentReference[oaicite:8]{index=8}

In short: They are introducing by far the most important and complex part of a long-troubled project – and for this, the system is temporarily shut down. This is not a routine operation, but a high-risk intervention on the open heart of the welfare state.

4. Background: When IT failures have already caused pain

Anyone who believes this is only a theoretical risk doesn't need to look far back:

  • In March 2025, there was a software/network problem in the SECO environment that resulted in tens of thousands of unemployed people receiving their money late. Media reports speak of around 135,000 affected people whose payments were processed with one to two days' delay.:contentReference[oaicite:9]{index=9}

At that time, it was an unplanned incident that could at least be resolved within a few days. Nevertheless, it clearly showed:

When the payment infrastructure of unemployment insurance falters, real existing people are the collateral damage – not abstract "system users."

Against this background, the now planned, significantly longer interruption seems particularly precarious: What if unforeseeable problems are added to the planned downtime?

5. Communication strategy: Reassuring rather than seriously involving

The information policy of SECO and the federal government follows a familiar pattern:

  • It relies on technically correct but abstract formulations ("operational interruption," "data migration," "efficiency increase," "security enhancement").:contentReference[oaicite:10]{index=10}
  • It emphasizes that monthly payment is "fundamentally ensured" – but only conditionally transparently formulates where exactly the risks lie.:contentReference[oaicite:11]{index=11}
  • Communication runs primarily top-down via press releases, official websites and social media snippets, but not in a language that many affected people intuitively understand.

From a democratic policy perspective, the question arises:

Is it legitimate to take such a critical social insurance system offline for two weeks – without first having a broad political debate about alternatives, compensations and emergency mechanisms?

6. Alternatives that apparently were never seriously discussed

The Clarus News article already points to a central gap: Were there migration scenarios without total shutdown?:contentReference[oaicite:12]{index=12}

Typical alternatives in comparable major projects would be:

  • Parallel operation of old and new systems with gradual migration.
  • Rollout by cantons or funds, instead of big-bang conversion.
  • Feature flag approaches to maximally protect critical core processes (payment) and only temporarily freeze partial functions.

That SECO nevertheless decided on a complete operational interruption is justified technically (data consistency, synchronization, avoiding data loss). From the perspective of a critical observer, however, the impression arises:

They optimize primarily for system logic and project planning – and only secondarily for social robustness against errors.

7. Governance questions: Who bears responsibility if it goes wrong?

Another problem is the diffuse responsibility:

  • The project has been running for years under changing responsibilities and with repeated EFK warnings.:contentReference[oaicite:13]{index=13}
  • Politically, responsibility is distributed among committees, supervisory commissions and technical project management.
  • But for those affected, there is only one visible actor: the state – specifically SECO and the unemployment funds.

If there is no clearly named, politically responsible "owner" of the risk, the usual pattern threatens in case of error:

  • Those affected are temporarily without money.
  • Funds and RAV are burdened with emergency solutions and overtime.
  • Those responsible point to "unforeseen problems" and "complex IT projects."

8. What should happen now – before the switch is flipped

Responsible handling of such a system change would require more than technical project planning and a press release. Specifically, the following would be needed:

  1. Transparent risk report for the public

    • Clear presentation of possible error scenarios and their consequences for benefit recipients.
    • Publication of the most important EFK recommendations and their implementation status in understandable language.

  2. Binding hardship and emergency mechanisms

    • Legally secured assurance that no one cannot pay their rent or bills due to system problems.
    • Possibility of advance payments or transitional benefits in case of demonstrable IT-related delays.

  3. Independent monitoring of the go-live

    • Accompanying supervision (e.g., by EFK or external expert committees) that checks in real-time during and immediately after the system change whether the processes are functioning.

  4. Real communication at eye level

    • Information campaign in simple language, multilingual and via channels that unemployed people actually use.
    • Concrete examples: "What do I have to do by when?", "What happens if I miss the deadline?", "Who do I contact if no money comes?"

  5. Subsequent political evaluation

    • Mandatory public evaluation: Did the system change work? Who was affected and how severely?
    • Consequences for poor planning – not only at the project level, but also in political responsibility.

9. Conclusion

ASALfutur and the introduction of ASAL 2.0 are fundamentally legitimate and probably also necessary steps toward a modern, more efficient administration. Nobody wants central social benefits to run on fragile legacy systems for decades.

But the way this final implementation step is organized shows a structural problem of Swiss digital policy:

  • Technology and project logic dominate over social policy caution.
  • Risks are not openly discussed politically, but outsourced to technical expert committees.
  • Those who have the least room for maneuver – unemployed people in financially strained situations – de facto bear the greatest risk.

A welfare state that deliberately takes its most critical infrastructure offline for two weeks must accept an uncomfortable question:

Does IT serve people – or must people subordinate themselves to IT logic?

As long as this question is not answered offensively and transparently, ASALfutur remains less a promise for the future than a risky stress test for trust in Switzerland's digital administration.

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